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The United States Army in the past five years has begun
a revolutionary change in its concept of training. The Army
Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is the realization
of this change. The implementation of the ARTEP has not
achieved optimal results. Training management decisions at
division, brigade, and battalion levels must be identified
and their ramifications understood; research has shown cer-
tain approaches more beneficial than others. The training/
evaluation/control of external exercises using ARTEP has
been identified as a universally deficient area.
This study, through application of organizational and
managerial principles, provides practical guidance to
training decision makers from division down to company
level. It also provides an improved system for the training/
evaluation/control of the external exercise.
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I. GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) . A training
program designed to: establish unit training missions with
specified tasks, conditions, and standards of performance for
combat-critical missions; train and evaluate the ability of
the unit to perform specified missions under simulated com-
bat conditions; evaluate the effectiveness of past training
of all echelons of the force; and assess future training
needs. When supplemented with the appropriate directives,
ARTEP serves as the basis for evaluation by which the level
of training proficiency can be determined.
Collective Training . Training, either in institutions or
units, that prepares a group of individuals (crews, teams,
squads, platoons) to accomplish tasks required of the group
as an entity.
Controller/Simulator (C/S) . A person who implements simula-
tion activities to increase the combat realism of the ARTEP.
Evaluation of Training . That process which, by objective
and subjective means, seeks to determine the extent of
learning progress of individuals and units. The purpose is
to determine if a training objective has been attained and
how well the available resources have been used in order to
provide the training manager with the information he needs
to modify or update the training program, and to provide
feedback to trainers and soldiers undergoing training.
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External Evaluation . An evaluation of a unit initiated by
higher headquarters which will diagnose the state of trainin
proficiency of that unit,, e.g., an external ARTEP evaluation
which will be conducted either with or without advance notice,
as needed to maintain training accountability and status.
Historical Information . Within the scope of this paper,
training information that has value or potential value for
trainers and/or training managers. Examples are performance
data on specific missions (target hits, time to completion,
etc.) or conditions under which missions were performed
(weather, personnel fill, etc.).
Individual Training . Training the individual officer, NCO,
or enlisted person receives, either in institutions or units,
that prepares the individual to perform specified duties and
tasks related to the assigned MOS and duty position.
Information System . Within the scope of this paper, a system
that gathers, processes and distributes information to
improve training and training management.
Internal Evaluation . An evaluation of a unit initiated by
the unit commander in order to ascertain, for his use, the
state of training proficiency of that unit. An example
would be: the internal ARTEP evaluation which is conducted
as often as the commander desires and resources allow.
Mission Related Training . That training which contributes
to a unit's ability to successfully accomplish its combat

missions. This training is conducted in the unit and may
consist of either collective or individual training and
evaluation. An example of mission-related training would be
training designed to enhance a battalion's ability to defend
against an enemy attack.
Need Additional Training (NAT) . Used in place of "Unsatis-
factory" as an evaluation rating. Expresses the true meaning
of a non-satisfactory accomplishment of a training mission/
task.
Off-Line T/E . In constructing the training exercise for
the battalion external ARTEP, that training and evaluation
of missions which take place outside of a scenario sequence.
On-Line T/E . In constructing the training exercise for the
battalion external ARTEP, that training and evaluation of
missions which take place within a scenario sequence.
Opposing Force (OPFOR) . A unit totally dedicated to opposing
another unit. The OPFOR would normally use enemy threat
doctrine while opposing a unit that is conducting ARTEP
missions.
Prime Time Training . Collective or individual training
designed to develop and maintain unit capability to accomplish
assigned Table of Organization and Equipment/Modified Table
of Organization and Equipment (TOE/MTOE) missions and
contingency missions.

Single Battalion Evaluation . An exclusive evaluation of
one battalion during a given period of time. The prime
focus of all efforts is to achieve the best training/
evaluation of the subject battalion.
Skill Qualification Test (SQT) . A test that measures a
soldier's individual skill ability based on the tasks shown
in the Soldier's Manual.
Soldier's Manual . Describes what is expected of each soldier
for his appropriate Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)
skill level and duty position. It contains instructions on
how to learn new skills and explains the standards which
must be met for evaluation.
Standard . An integral part of any training objective. The
standard clearly defines the level of performance expected
of those undergoing training. Wherever possible standards
are expressed in quantifiable or measurable terms in order
to determine if the training has been successful. The
standards for training should be exactly the same as those
used for evaluation.
Subunit Evaluation (SUE) . The mission/task evaluation of
specific subordinate elements of a unit. For example, the
evaluation of a selected company, platoon, and squad mission/
task performance during ARTEP.

Supplemental Missions . Those missions necessitated by
conditions common to combat but not necessarily integral to
a particular type of operation.
Task . A statement which specified an action to be performed
by an individual or team/unit.
Training/Evaluation (T/E) . Refers to the collective and/or
individual training and the simultaneous evaluation of that
training.
Trainer/Evaluator/Contro.ller (T/E/C) . An individual who is
responsible for the training, evaluation and control of a
unit conducting collective training under ARTEP
.
Training and Evaluation Outline (T&EO) . Essentially a task/
conditions/standards outline, as found in the ARTEP on
which will be shown the unit, its mission, the general con-
dition under which the mission is to be performed, the primary
training and evaluation standards upon which the unit will
be evaluated, and the performance oriented objectives which
describe the tasks, conditions, and standards for the mission.
The T&EO should also include the estimated support require-
ments (e.g., Threat Forces, maneuver area, etc.) necessary
to conduct training or evaluation of the mission.
Training Management . The art of employing limited resources
(human, physical, financial and time) in a manner that permits
efficient and effective development of individuals and units
10

so they can successfully accomplish their peace and wartime
missions.
Two Battalion Evaluation . A simultaneous evaluation of two
battalions during a given period of time. This method of
training/evaluation is characterized by reciprocal action,
in which the two battalions oppose each other, alternatively




The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is an
on-going, comprehensive program by which units and sub-units
attain and maintain combat readiness. This relatively new
program ^requires training managers and trainers at all levels
to be especially familiar with the ARTEP philosophy and to
understand the implications of the decisions that they make.
The scope of this paper includes guidance and recommenda-
tions for implementation for the ARTEP in general, with pri-
mary emphasis on the battalion external training/evaluation.
This emphasis does not infer primary importance of the external
training/evaluation, but indicates the need for improvements
in this area.
At Division level, the key decisions to be made regard
resource allocation and organizational management of ARTEP.
Since all unit training programs are a combination of fre-
quent, internal T/E and the infrequent external T/E exercise,
Division must provide for adequate resources to support both
phases. The internal phase of ARTEP, by definition, is
managed at Battalion level or lower, so Division merely has
to allocate and monitor gross resources and the Brigades/
Battalions will manage them. However, three vital decisions
must be made' regarding the external T/E exercises very early
in the Division Master Training Program. These decisions
concern sponsorship, evaluation approach and organization of
12

the exercise. Because the Battalion level external T/E
exercises consume great amounts of resources, it is impera-
tive that they be managed to achieve the most training value
for the evaluated unit. Brigade sponsorship of external
T/E exercises is recommended to preserve the diagnostic
character of ARTEP and to enhance individual tailoring for
each battalion. The single battalion approach of evaluation/
control is recommended because of the unwieldiness of the
alternative, the two battalion approach, where two battalions
are trained/evaluated simultaneously. The concentration
afforded the unit in the single battalion approach offers
fewer control problems and thus better training/evaluation.
The structuring of the external T/E exercise involves a large
number of varied missions and sub-tasks. Some require ranges
and special situations; others fit easily into an ongoing
tactical scenario. The addition of an offline portion could
accommodate the former. For these reasons, a combination of
offline and online mission evaluations separated by a short
interval is recommended as the structure for the external
T/E exercise.
Brigade level decisions deal with resource management of
assets allocated by Division; also, under brigade sponsorship,
the brigade must make the same decisions regarding evaluation
approach and structure. The selection of brigade sponsorship
is normally a result of conferences between the division
commander/G-3 and the brigade commander/S-3 . Implicit in this
arrangement is an underlying "contract" between the division
13

and the brigade: for a given amount of training resources
division expects a stated level of training proficiency.
The guidance given in these two areas is the same for Divi-
sion or Brigade: single battalion approach and combination
of offline and online structure. The brigade commander,
based on discussions with battalion commanders, should be
allowed to select which battalion should perform its external
T/E exercise within a time frame allotted by Division.
At battalion level, resources must be managed to provide
for quarterly internal T/E exercises. The battalion training
program should provide for integrated individual and collec-
tive training to achieve and maintain Soldier' s Manual and
ARTEP standards. Maximum use should be made of the battalion's
own assets for internal T/E. Current training management
procedures, specifically organization under decentralized
training, can be used to great advantage.
At company level, T/E is conducted. The Company Commander
is primarily a trainer, not a resource manager. At company
level, resource management is accomplished only to facili-
tate training.
The use of T/E results should include immediate feedback
to the performing unit. This feedback consists of oral T/E
comments made directly to the leader concerned, on the
terrain where the action occurred. These comments are normally
followed by written feedback that provides the basis for
historical information that is useful in training analysis
14

at all levels. An additional feedback loop results from
the external T/E wherein the Trainer/Evaluator/Controller
(T/E/C) provides not only immediate oral feedback as pre-
viously described, but also a written evaluation that ulti-
mately returns to the evaluated unit. Commanders at all
levels can check the training status of their units at any
time by personal evaluation.
However, an important indicator of the training status
of a battalion, available to the Division/Brigade/Battalion
Commander, is the external T/E exercise; and the key to
obtaining an accurate evaluation is the (T/E/C) system.
Specific recommended improvements to the T/E/C guidance given
in ARTEP 71-2, should provide a higher quality T/E for the
performing unit and more useful evaluative information for
the sponsoring headquarters. A fundamental structure of an
information system is realized; useful information for train-
ing managers and for high level analysis is potentially
available.
The improved T/E/C system includes closer involvement
by the parent brigade headquarters and more attention to
the proper selection and training of T/E/C personnel. The
Opposing Forces (OPFOR) element also assumes additional
importance and responsibilities.
A well-structured T/E/C system for an external T/E exer-
cise does not necessarily imply commitment of additional
resources. It does imply optimal use of resources already
committed. The fact that sufficient personnel, time, and
15

equipment are allocated to the training/evaluation/control
of an external T/E effort does not guarantee T/E/C effec-
tiveness. A high level of training management and organiza-
tional skill can increase T/E/C effectiveness with no corres-






Collective training in the United States Army has been
based on an Army Training Test (ATT) /Army Training Program
(ATP) mobilization model developed during World War II.
That model was designed to train units in a progressive,
sequential program for mobilization to deploy to a combat,
theater at a scheduled date. While effective for its
original purpose, this is not suited for today's needs.
The current requirements for immediate deployment with
combat ready units, doctrinal changes to accommodate in-
creased weapons lethality, increasingly complex weapons,
increasing maintenance requirements, higher costs, and eco-
logical constraints are all changes in the training environ-
ment which have caused a conceptual change within the Army
Training System. The Army Training and Evaluation Program
(ARTEP) is not related at all to the ATT/ATP, rather it is
a revolutionary conceptual change which is designed to assist
trainers and training managers in the conduct and management
of the training needed to prepare a unit to survive and win
on the modern battlefield.
ARTEP is a training and evaluation program that provides
critical combat training objectives to units. It is a change
in training philosophy that integrates both training and
evaluation, with a focus on what should be done tomorrow to
correct training weaknesses identified today. This is
17

accomplished by giving the trainer/evaluator training objec-
tives (tasks, conditions, and standards) which include criti-
cal combat tasks that a unit must be proficient in, the condi-
tions under which tasks must be performed, and specific
standards that should be met. With these objectives and
other information found in the ARTEP ' s training and evalua-
tion outlines (T&EO) , the leader at each level can plan,
conduct, and evaluate his training continuously. The ARTEP
concept was approved in August 1975 by the Department of the
Army for Army-wide implementation.
A major field research effort was conducted by the Army
Research Institute (ARI) , beginning in December 1976, to
analyze the methods used by field units in implementing the
ARTEP for a Tank/Mechanized Infantry Task Force. This three
volume report, completed in January 1978, is titled "Improved
ARTEP Methods for Unit Evaluation." The information sources
used in the ARI study were: field observations, interviews,
consultations and literature. Seven battalions and subordinate
units, representing four different divisions — two infantry
and two armor — were sampled. All units were in the continental
United States. Since the change from ATT/ATP concept to ARTEP
concepts is revolutionary, not evolutionary, it is not sur-
prising that the research revealed significant problems and
variations of problems in ARTEP implementation. It should
be noted and emphasized that although the research analysis
was often critical of ARTEP, the ARTEP was unequivocally
18

judged by users and analysts alike as superior to its prede-
cessor, the ATT/ATP concept. The analysis by ARI is simply
a means of refining and improving a program that is still
in its infancy.
Although our background research included the work that
had been done by ARI, it also encompassed additional research
on actual ARTEP after-action reports, and nearly three years
of practical experience and field observations. Throughout
our research, problems were identified at all levels and in
various phases of ARTEP, however, the pervading issues had
to do with organizing, tactically structuring, controlling,
and supporting the ARTEP training/evaluation exercises.
Problems emerged in the decision process in assigning ratings
and in the use of results to provide feedback. Local commands
dealt with these problems with varying degrees of success.
A need for practical management guidance for planners
,
trainers, training managers, and evaluators has arisen;
ARTEP 71-2 and associated Training Circulars have not yet
filled that need.
Specifically, then, the problem addressed in our thesis
is this: the current management of ARTEP in the field often
does not result in achieving maximum training value for the
participating unit.
The approach adopted to address this problem is a prac-
tical format providing specific guidance to commanders/
trainers/training managers at various levels to improve the
efficiency of ARTEP implementation. Basic organizational
19

and managerial principles were applied in formulating these
recommended improvements. These principles, modified to
fit the context of this problem, include the following:
The activities of an organization should lead, directly
or indirectly, towards the achievement of the organiza-
tion's stated goals.
Delegation of responsibility and authority to the lowest
functionally efficient level.
Resource allocation decisions are a management function,
not an operations function.
In an organization whose goals are essentially the
refining of collective skills, decentralization of
effort is optimal.
Feedback must somehow be made available to management
in order to maintain a dynamic, adaptive organization.
The application of these principles , although not always
stated as such, should be apparent in the guidance and
recommendations, which are explained in some detail.
20

IV. CHAPTER 1: DIVISION AND BRIGADE GUIDANCE
FOR THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY
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IV. CHAPTER 1; DIVISION AND BRIGADE GUIDANCE
FOR THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
Division and brigade decisions involving the ARTEP are
directly related to the availability of ARTEP training
resources, the level of command sponsorship and the training
proficiency of the units. Decisions related to the ARTEP must
take into account the original ARTEP purposes which are: to
evaluate the ability of a tactical unit to perform specified
missions under simulated combat conditions; to provide a
guide for training by specifying mission standards of per-
formance for combat-critical missions and tasks; to evaluate
the effectiveness of collective training of all echelons from
crew/squad through battalion/task force; and to provide an
assessment of future training needs. Guidance and recommen-
dations in this area are included in the following chapter.
B. SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Division/Brigade Training Program should provide for:
• kd.nqixa.tn fie.Aoun,ce.& to 6uppon.t zont-lnuouk lnte.n.na.t
T/E zx.ZA.ctb z-i by zack ma.ne.uvzn. battatton.
• Ade.qua.t2. n.z& o uA.ce.-i> to buppofit pZannzd zxtzinaZ T/E
zxzn.ci.h e4 .
For external T/E exercise:
• Brigade. 6ponAoA.Ah.tp
.
• StngZz batta.tX.OYi zvaZuatton.
• Combtnatton oft ofi&Ztnz and onZtnz mX.kbi.on zvaZuatton.
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ARTEP recording and reporting systems:
• Sh.ou.ld pAovtdz jJo/l acc.uA.atz, de.tai.Zzd data at
battalion ZzvzZ.
• SkouZd pAovi.dz faoA bu.mmani.zzd data at bAtgadz and
di.VA.bi.on ZzvzZ.
• Can pA.ovi.dz babtb ofi qu.anti.tati.vz data &oa tA.ai.ni.ng
AzbzaAch and anaZybib .
C. DISCUSSION OF GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Tkz Vi.vi.bi.on/BAi.gadz TAai.ni.ng PA.ogA.am bhou.JLd pAovtdz
&0A. adzquatz AZbouAczb to buppoAt conttnuoub ZntzAnaZ
T/E zxzA.ci.bzb by zach manzuvzA battaZ-Lon.
In order to fulfill the purposes of the ARTEP, sufficient
training time is necessary not only to build up the profi-
ciency of the units but to also maintain it. As a guideline,
at least one month per quarter of the annual training cycle
for maneuver battalions should be devoted to ARTEP proficiency,
In providing the units with adequate time most Divisions use
a system of prioritizing training time. An example would be
a green, yellow, red phasing where green is priority training
time (T/E exercises, Gunnery)
,
yellow is lesser priority
training time (Non-field training) and red is Mission and
Divisional Support time. Figure 1-1 shows this type of
system on a portion of a Division Master Training Schedule.






Management of available terrain in order to allow ade-
quate field maneuver areas is often a major link to the
success of the T/E. If the amount of field training area
is such that difficulties arise when more than one maneuver
battalion trains simultaneously then a possible alternative
would be to allocate sufficient terrain to the brigade that
in the example, is in green time where it can be managed
more efficiently than at division level. Although obviously
there are real limits to the flexible use of training areas
,
repetition of the same missions over the same ground does
little to inject surprise, fresh tactical thinking, or
troop enthusiasm into the T/E exercise.
The ARTEP is designed so that the commander can stay
abreast of his units' collective training proficiency. The
units' strengths and weaknesses should be constantly monitored
through internal evaluation which is the key to a successful
program. Although Commanders' visits to their units con-
ducting T/E are considered internal evaluation, they may
not provide enough information on the actual collective
training proficiency level of the unit. If needed, additional
sources of information are available, one of which is the
external T/E exercise.
• The. V-iv-i^-ion/BA-igade. TA.a-Ln.lyig PAogAam ikoa-td pAov-cde.
^oa adz.qu.at2. Ae.&ouAc.e.i> to AuppoAt planned e.x.te.A.naZ
T/E zxe.Ad& e.6 .
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The Division Master Training Schedule and the Division
Plan for annual training are influenced by so many variables
that any set guidance is difficult. ARTEP 71-2 describes
the procedure for conducting battalion external T/E exer-
cises, but does not prescribe a minimum frequency. This
built-in flexibility offers great advantages to division
level planners who have to manage resources to maintain an
effective training posture while still satisfying the require-
ments of less visible activities, such as post support,
Reserve/National Guard affiliation programs, etc. A general
guideline is to maintain a Division Master Training Schedule
that provides adequate resources to support at least one
external T/E for each maneuver battalion per twelve to
eighteen month period. While this guidance may seem less
strenuous than most existing lower level policies , it should
be noted that there is no implied reduction of frequency of
ARTEP training and/or internal T/E's. Furthermore, the
Division/Brigade Commander can tailor the frequency of external
T/E ' s to meet individual battalions ' needs . Within this con-
text, the external T/E will require better management of
resources, specifically in the trainer/evaluator/controller
system. An improved system will be described in detail in
Chapter 3
.




Sponsorship refers to the specific headquarters that
plays the predominant role in planning, supporting, and
training/evaluating a battalion in its external T/E. Both
division and brigade level sponsorship offer several advan-
tages and disadvantages. Under division sponsorship, more
staff assets are available for formulating the plan and con-
siderably more resources are available to implement it. On
the other hand, division control has psychological as well
as physical drawbacks. Division control fosters a "test"
atmosphere for the performing unit; its leaders perceive
Division as a remote headquarters unfamiliar with the battalion
and unsympathetic with its peculiar problems . If not care-
fully avoided, division control can lead to a "canned" external
T/E plan insensitive to a particular battalion's needs. This
situation would seriously violate the philosophy of the ARTEP
as a diagnostic training tool. The perception at lower
levels, whether justified or not, would be reinforced that
k
external T/E performance is the measure of performance for
the Battalion Commander and the battalion, and that nothing
short of all "Satisfactory" results is acceptable. It is
also likely that the competition engendered by the Division
approach would produce intensive efforts to "G-2" the problem
and train accordingly. Physically, the ready availability
and accessibility of Division resources invites over-use and
waste.
Brigade sponsorship, however, encourages austerity and
innovation. The natural (and desired) tendency is to do as
27

much as possible with Brigade organic assets. Because non-
organic assets will have to be justified, excesses and
waste should be reduced. Also, the stigma of external T/E
as a test is lessened as Brigade is more in touch with the
battalion's needs and capabilities. The external T/E plan
can be individually tailored for each battalion. The train-
ing rather than the test nature of the external T/E is
thereby enhanced.
Weighing the advantages and disadvantages of both approaches,
it is recommended that brigade sponsorship be used. Any
staff "learning" that takes place in the sponsoring brigade
headquarters can be passed to the other brigades through the
ARTEP element of Division G-3, which plays a planning advis-
ory role in the brigade sponsorship approach.
• fon. nxtzstnaZ ARTE? zxtfici* £4 , 6-ingte. battalion
zva.Zu.a.£<LanA a.iz nzcommtYidiid.
In planning the allocation of resources for external
T/E's, Division/Brigade headquarters must decide whether to
use the Two Battalion approach or the Single Battalion
approach. The Two Battalion approach offers the advantage
of simultaneous T/E of two battalions in one exercise. The
economy of resources available here is obvious. The disad-
vantages of this approach, however, are significant. The
task of evaluation and control of two battalion size forces
at essentially the same time requires a considerable resource
28

commitment, one that a single brigade could not adequately
meet. Sponsorship then falls to Division, a less than
desirable approach for reasons already given. Also, the
combat realism of the T/E suffers. In the worst case, the
battalions oppose each other, each using standard US tactics.
The value of this type of exercise is clearly low and in
fact is hardly compatible with the ARTEP. In the best case,
where the opposing units take turns using Threat doctrine
and tactics, a stop-start syndrome develops, degrading the
continuity of the exercise for its players, with the subse-
quent negative effects on combat realism. The training
benefit of sustained, realistic operations is thus forfeited.
The Single Battalion approach avoids both of these pit-
falls. The resources required for evaluation and control are
reduced; Brigade sponsorship is possible. The OPFOR can be
a totally dedicated force. Some training in Threat doctrine
and tactics would be expected. Training aids and local
ingenuity could be employed to enhance the physical appear-
ance of the OPFOR. This approach offers a distinct improve-
ment in the quality of the OPFOR when compared to the previously
described alternative. The quality of the OPFOR is one of
the key factors in attaining combat realism during the T/E
exercise. Another key factor is the control and tactical
simulation of combat action. This factor, when viewed as a
problem, can never be solved, only improved upon. The
evaluation/control system described in Chapter 3 is this type
29

of improvement. The Two Battalion approach is unworkable
under this improved system. If there is a disadvantage to
the Single Battalion approach it is in possibly increased
resource expenditures.
Proponents of the Two Battalion approach argue for its
greater economy of resources. There is a question, however,
as to the amount of resource savings, if any. In considering
the two alternative approaches the increased training/evaluation/
control available under the Single Battalion approach is the
dominant factor. Therefore, the Single Battalion approach
is recommended.
• ton. zxt.zA.nat T/E zxzA.cti e-6 , a. combi.na.tA.uvi ofa ofafaZJLnz/
onLLnz mi.AA<Lon <Lva.L\xa.ti.oni> -t-i h.zcommzndzd.
ARTEP 71-2 specifically states the mission requirements
for a Battalion Task Force external T/E: at least six of
nine primary missions, and seven of the eleven supplemental
missions must be performed. Factors that Division/Brigade
should consider when making the mission selections include
the expected mode of employment in combat, contingency mission
responsibilities, recent informal T/E results, and training
resources available. The temptation is to try to force too
many of both types of missions into a scenario. The result
Department of the Army, ARTEP 71-2, p. 5-10, 1977.
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is often a cluttered, intricate, overly intensive schedule
for the performing unit; time for planning and troop leading
procedures are often sacrificed in order to adhere to a
scenario that squeezes in too many missions.
The recommendation here is to keep things as simple as
possible in the online portion by selecting a minimal number
of primary and supplemental missions required for a Level 1
evaluation. Since resource availability normally restricts
a battalion external T/E to a 3-4 day exercise, judicious
planning of time is needed for even these minimum number of
missions. The value of executing a simple plan well exceeds
that of executing a more ambitious plan poorly.
In constructing the scenario, the ideal is to arrange the
selected primary and supplemental missions in a tactical
sequence to optimize workability, realism, and tactical
soundness. ARTEP 71-2 lays out a series of planning steps
to follow. However, there is no simple mechanical formula
to use. Each headquarters has its own set of variables and
constraints; the scenario should be a result of staff planning
in the truest sense. Failure to involve any of the principal
staff input early in the formulation stage will amost surely
result in compounding problems later on. The end result
scenario should resemble an interval of expected combat
employment in real time. The sequence of missions should
"flow" with credibility for the players.
In planning for this flow of action in the scenario, it
must be noted that evaluation of some subunit missions plainly
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violate this principle, and therefore are prime candidates
for offline evaluation (evaluation that takes place outside
of the scenario) . Clearcut examples of such candidates are
the Mortar Platoon Live Fire and the infantry squad Forced
March/Live Fire. Because of the live fire range requirements,
it is virtually impossible to credibly incorporate these mis-
sions into a tactical scenario. Many missions are tailor-
made for evaluation within a scenario, such as squad recon-
naissance patrol and platoon defense of a strongpoint.
Therefore, it should be advantageous to evaluate some missions
at squad, platoon, or even company level offline. This prac-
tice has the added benefit of being much more amenable to
employing training aids such as SCOPES, REALTRAIN, etc. Some
of the subunit missions may be of particular interest to
commanders and as such deserving of a closer evaluation than
can readily be achieved online. However, should this selec-
tive offline approach be used, it is strongly recommended
that offline events not run concurrently with the online
scenario. An example of a Battalion training schedule of
selected missions for offline evaluation is shown in Figure
1-2. A similar example is also shown in Chapter 3, Figure
3-4. Note that the end of the offline segment is separated
from the start of the online Battalion scenario by 3-4 days.
• ARTE? n.e.c.0 A. (Ling and n.zpo fitting Ay&tzmA 6nouZd piov<Lde.
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Accurate record keeping of all ARTEP training is a
necessity in maintaining collective training proficiency
(as well as developing the training posture) of the unit.
Although detailed ARTEP after action reports should not be
necessary or required at division level it is a must at
battalion and lower levels. Desired information should be
obtained from all internal training/evaluations as well as
external. Such information as number and type of target
hits, duration times, strengths, weaknesses, unit leaders,
mission evaluation ratings should all be maintained in some
form. The Training and Evaluation Outlines contained in the
ARTEP manual are ideal for recording much of the information.
• ARTEP izco tiding avid. i2.pox.tJ.ng by&tzmi, AnouZd pnovLdz
Ion 4umm<Vi4.z<id data at btitgadz and dtv-lb-ion tzvzt.
The burden of recording and maintaining detailed and
accurate T/E information should lie with the primary user
of that information, the battalion. This does not intend
to imply that no information should be maintained by brigade
and division. The brigade should require summarized reporting,
probably on a quarterly basis, from battalions regarding
current ARTEP internal training/evaluations . An example of
a report format is shown Figure 1-3. The example provides the
brigade with ^a brief analysis of the most recent ARTEP training/
evaluation conducted and the next expected or planned training.
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ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (ARTEP) REPORT
TO: FROM: DATE:




MISSIONS EVALUATED (ARTEP 71-2)










General unit weaknesses should be shown to allow for any
brigade level training management that may be required.
Division level training managers need only that information
which influences training resources allocation.
• ARTE? tKLc.0n.d4.Yig and fio.poKtA.Yig bybtz.mi> can pKovtdo,
a baA-i.4 ofi quantA.tat.-iv 2. data &ok tK.atntng KztzaKck
and anatyt>t& .
Future training developments and improvements in current
techniques, doctrine and the overall effectiveness of the
ARTEP for the units in the field is an ongoing responsibility
at all levels. The current Evaluation Feedback Sheets (Chapter
13, ARTEP 71-2) are an effort at concentrating field data
to assist in this area. In order to continually update and
improve the quality of the ARTEP more detailed data is re-
quired. Although the field units should be the primary users
of detailed T/E data it can also be used in training research
and analysis for overall training improvement. For this
reason historical data, that has been maintained by field
units, is a valuable data source. The Infantry School and
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) maintain an ongoing




V. CHAPTER 2: BATTALION AND COMPANY GUIDANCE
FOR THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY
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V. CHAPTER 2: BATTALION AND COMPANY GUIDANCE
FOR THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
The Training Program at battalion level and below is a
critical tool for developing and maintaining collective
training proficiency. Its structuring and management will
be the key to a successful training program. Battalion
training managers must control all of the training resources
available to them in such a way as to provide the company
commanders, the principle trainers, with their required
training resources. The Soldier's Manuals and the ARTEP are
the basis of the training structure. The learning of the
individual skills from the Soldier's Manuals and the collec-
tive skills from the ARTEP are an integral process and can
only be accomplished effectively under a complete training
program. The soldier's development and his understanding
of the fact that his individual skills are critical to the
development of his unit's collective skills is the foundation
for his understanding of Soldier's Manual (SM) and ARTEP
integration. Individual training is a basic building block.
Collective training introduces new or additional requirements
in that individuals must time their responses with each other
and they must learn to act as a smoothly functioning unit,
organizing their efforts.
Improvement of training weaknesses and retention of
training strengths can only be managed through an information
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system that provides both immediate feedback to unit leaders
and individuals and detailed documentation to the managers.
Through this process the soldier and his unit leaders can
concentrate their efforts continuously on their known train-
ing weaknesses while the training managers can organize
battalion T/E with major efforts directed towards correcting
overall unit weaknesses.
B. SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Battalion Training Program should provide for:
• lnt2.QfLa.tz.di tnd-lvA.du.a.Z and coZZzcttvz tnatntng to
ach.te.ve. a.nd matntatn SU and ARTE? &tanda.n,d&.
• Qu.aKte.tLly T/E zxznctbe.6 u6tng ARTE?.
• ngantzatto n undzn dzczntnaltzzd tnatntng.
• Complete, uaz o{ own tnatne.M> / zvaZuatom {on tntznnal
T/E z.xz.ncti> za .
Company Training Program should:
• Be the. {ocaZ potnt o{ att untt acttvttte.6 .
• ?novtdz. {on. pnacttcal tz.ckntquzA o{ SU and ARTE?
tntzgn.atton.
The proper use of ARTEP Training/Evaluation results
should:
• ?novtde. tkz. untt bztng tnatnzd/ tvatuatzd wttk
tmmzdtatz. {e.z.dback.
• Vn.Qvtde. {on. tkz matntatntng o{ accurate., dz.ta.tlzd
tn{on.matton on -6 ztz.ctz.d mtAAtonA that wznz. conducte.d.
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C. DISCUSSION OF GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• BattatXrOn Tn.aX.nX.ng Pn.ogia.rn 4h.ou.ld pnovXdz faon,
inte.gn.atzd XndX.vXdu.at and cottzc.tX.vz tn.aX.ni.ng to
ac.kX.zvz and matntatn SM and ARTEP 4tandan.dA .
At battalion level, there should be an ongoing program
of training that maintains a level of proficiency for the
individuals based on the SM and for the units based on ARTEP.
Knowledge and skills required by the SM are by no means dif-
ferent than those required by the ARTEP. The distinction is
simply that the SM provides individual training objectives
while the T/E of ARTEP focuses on collective skills. The
interfaces of the individual skills identified in the SM,
that support unit skills required for successful performance
in an ARTEP mission/task, are in the process of being com-
piled and presented as a practical tool for training managers
Faced with the current resource constraints, units can
no longer afford to address SM and ARTEP as two separate
training goals. The evolution of SM with emphasis on
"hands-on" performance-oriented training is a natural exten-
sion of ARTEP. SM and ARTEP are closely interdependent, as
they should be. Just as a unit's training proficiency is
some function of the individual performances of its members
and the collective performances of its sub-units, the T/E of
a unit to achieve training proficiency is some function of
the T/E of SM tasks and the T/E using ARTEP.
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The Battalion over-all training program should integrate
the T/E of individual and collective skills. The results
from T/E using ARTEP provides the Battalion Commander with
an assessment of his unit's training strengths and weaknesses.
The future training activities should provide, within resource
constraints, an improvement in weak areas, and maintenance
of proficiency in strong areas. The fundamental structure
of any well-trained unit rests on well-trained individuals.
The impact of SQT on the Enlisted Personnel Management
System (EPMS) is so great that in many, if not most, cases
there is a built-in incentive for the soldier to perform
well. Leadership must provide the incentive to excel in
collective skills through the development of unit pride and
esprit. An optimal training program should satisfy both
the needs of the individual and the unit.
Referring back to the green-red-yellow scheme of allocating
"prime" training time, a unit conducting T/E using ARTEP is
normally afforded green status during the time period imme-
diately preceding its scheduled exercise. As the ARTEP T/E
is primarily T/E of collective skills, it is natural to
expect the unit's training efforts to be toward that end.
The problem for the training manager, however, is how to
allocate training when in yellow or red status . It has already
been stated that internal T/E's should be performed continu-
ously by the unit to avoid the need for "peaking" prior to
an external evaluation. Internal T/E's are the most flexible
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of training tools. They can be supplemented by classroom,
map, or verbal exercises; they can consist of the more char-
acteristic field exercises; or any combination in between.
Unit trainers can develop or modify internal T/E's to rein-
force individual soldiers' skills. For example, a platoon
leader training/evaluating his platoon in the strongpoint
defense can insert on-the-spot requirements for individuals
such as putting a LAW into operation, actual range estima-
tion, crew-served weapons assembly/disassembly for non-
primary gunners, etc. Although these techniques may seem
patently obvious, the tendency in training has been to treat
individual and unit T/E separately. The more often that
direct association between SM skills and ARTEP missions can
be practiced , not merely verbalized, the more the perception
of interdependence will be increased.
As a unit approaches a time period when many of its mem-
bers are scheduled for SQT, the natural tendency is to mini-
mize other activities and "crash" on SQT training. Some
degree of this change of direction is expected and tolerable.
However, it is possible to retain the structure of internal
T/E using ARTEP as the training tool by which SQT is prepared
for. SM skills should be presented and trained for not in
the context of an event to "pass" on the hands-on portion of
SQT, but as an integral part of an ARTEP mission. Learning,
that can be associated with realistic or expected events, is
retained longer and with more accuracy. The simple analogy
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of "cramming" for exams and a few days later having little
or no recall emphasizes this point.
Individual training using the SM and collective training
using ARTEP should be mutually reinforcing. The interdepen-
dencies of individual and collective skills can and should
be stresed and practiced under the structure of internal
T/E's. The perception of these programs as separate enti-
ties, and SQT as solely an EPMS tool, must be eliminated.
It is the responsibility of the training managers to insure
that the training program allows sufficient planning and
resources for individuals to achieve their potential on
individual skills while the unit maintains high proficiency
on collective skills.
• Za.tta.ti. on TsiaJ.nA.ng ?n.QQfta.m Sh.ou.td Vxovtdz Fon.
(luaA.ttn.ty T/E ExeA.c-c.ie4 ustng ARTEP.
Internal T/E's using ARTEP in whole or in part, should
be incorporated into unit training programs throughout the
year. The frequency of internal T/E's will be dependent on
each unit's training needs, personnel turbulence, and
2
availability of training resources
.
Although the T/E under ARTEP is a continual daily process,
consideration should be given to conducting a well-organized
and fairly complete internal ARTEP T/E exercise once per




quarter. This exercise should be directly responsive to
the unit's training needs, concentrating on identified weak-
nesses. From this concept, the battalion can develop and
maintain training proficiency throughout the training cycle
rather than "peaking" just prior to the external ARTEP T/E.
Maintenance of proficiency at a high level is much pre-
ferred over a proficiency that widely fluctuates and then
peaks at external T/E time. Figure 2-1 illustrates three
types of proficiency flows: preferred, acceptable, and non-
preferred. There are a total of three years shown with an
external T/E occurring during the third quarter of the first
year and the second quarter of the third year. The pre-
ferred flow is attainable only under optimal conditions.
The acceptable flow is more realistic of a modern day unit
that has implemented a quarterly internal T/E program. The
non-preferred flow is typical of a unit that trains only for
the external T/E exercise. The level of proficiency can
only be determined as a result of an internal or external
ARTEP training/evaluation. Although, in general, the unit
is either considered as satisfactory or as needing additional
training, a level of proficiency within that spectrum can be
determined subjectively by the commander once he has com-
pleted the T/E and analyzed the results.
• Ba££aZ<Lon Tn.aA.nX.ng Vh.oQHa.rn Skoutd PA.0v4.de. Ton.











































How to organize and plan for an internal ARTEP training/
evaluation is not a simple process. However, the task
becomes much more manageable if basic concepts are adhered
to. One of these concepts is the decentralized organization
of battalion training.
Under decentralized training several steps of planning
and interactions occur. First, the company commander
assesses his training needs based on his observations and
on input from his platoon leaders and NCO's. The next step
is a weekly programming meeting with the battalion S-3
at which time the S-3 and company commanders iron out coor-
dinating details for two or three weeks hence. They may
also modify tentative training schedules to reflect the
company commanders' current assessments of training needs.
Third, the battalion S-3 then reconciles any scheduling
conflicts, to include training resource availability, and
ultimately publishes a battalion consolidated training
schedule.
With this concept the majority of actual training is
decentralized at least to company level while the adminis-
trative requirements (training schedules, training records,
range requests, etc.) are consolidated and accomplished at
battalion level.
Properly applied, decentralization breeds better leaders,
but at the same time requires better leadership on the part
of those responsible for their development. It requires of
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the battalion commander and his staff a high degree of
professionalism, planning and programming expertise, good
management of limited resources, and a complete willingness
to accept mistakes, set them right and proceed. Of the com-
pany commander, decentralized training demands the utmost
skill in the details of how to train men. Empathy, percep-
tion, initiative, imagination and creativity are his special
3purview.
Before a discussion of the battalion training schedule
the battalion training forecast needs to be addressed. The
battalion training forecast should be maintained as part of
a planning calendar at battalion level. The training fore-
case can be broken down to monthly forecasts for ease of
distribution to company level, readability, and workability
if necessary. An example of a battalion monthly training
forecast is shown in Figure 2-2. Note that even though the
battalion would not normally forecast training of individual
platoons, they are included as separate units under their
appropriate company. This is done to provide the company
commander not only with a forecast of the battalion ' s train-
ing but to provide the opportunity for him to further fore-
cast his company's training. The basis for the battalion
training forecast is the division master training schedule
and unit needs. This battalion training forecast example
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tracks with the earlier example of the division master
training schedule shown in Figure 1-1. The training phases
are discussed on page 23
.
The battalion training schedule can be published as one
schedule rather than as separate schedules for each company.
An example of a battalion consolidated training schedule for
an internal T/E using ARTEP is shown in Figure 2-3. Note
that this particular example includes three complete weeks
of training; the amount of time recommended to be devoted
to exercising a nearly complete internal training/evaluation.
The battalion movement order, operations orders, and SOP are
not included, however, the scheduling of the missions trained/
evaluated are included along with an example of a scheduling
procedure as attachments following Figure 2-3. In the example
it should be noted that the T/E is continual from 11 September
(Monday) through 28 September (Thursday) . This allows the
units sufficient time to both be trained and evaluated on
all unit missions at all levels. Since most of the scheduled
time for a unit's evaluation is only a portion of that unit's
training day, the remainder of that day can be used for addi-
tional training within the companies, concentrating on train-
ing weaknesses. In fact, depending on where the battalion
is in its training program and its level of proficiency,
the scheduling matrix could be modified to concentrate on
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(ARTEP 71-2 CHAP. 8)
APPENDIX
SQD MTC Cpt Thomas, Asst S-2 30
SQD FM/LF Cpt Smith, C Co 32
SQD Antiarmor Arab Cpt Hayes, S-l 33
SQD Recon Patrol Cpt Jones, S-2 31
SQD Def (B-U Area) Cpt Wilson, S-4 34
Crew Fire Cpt Gill, A Co 35
PLT MTC/H.A. Cpt Simms, B Co 21,22
PLT Def (B-U Area) Cpt Wilson, S-4 24
PLT Def (A/A) 1 LT James, Redeye 25
PLT/Co Atk (L.F.)
& PLT Def (L.F.) Maj Ames, S-3 13,27,28
Co MTC/H.A./Del Atk Cpt Hess, CSC 10,11,12
Co/PLT Def/St. P. Cpt Hess, CSC 15,16,17
& Co Delay 23 & 26
Bn FTX Maj Guthrie, XO 1-9,14,18,19,20,
.
36-38,41-44 & 46
*Also See Overlay to Bn Opns Ord #
FIGURE 2-3 (Attachment 3)
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• Ea.tta.lA.OYi Tfia.tn.tyiQ Vfiogfiam 4>houZd pfiovtde. iofi
compltto. u-6 e ofa own tfia,tnzfiA / e,va,Zuatosu> iofi
tntzfinal T/E zxzficti, e-6 .
Internal T/E exercises are the battalion and company
commanders' means of examining their decentralized training
program. Maximum use should be made of the battlion's own
trainers/evaluators and every effort should be made to find
the best qualified trainer/evaluator for each particular
mission. Attachment 3 to Figure 2-3 provides an example of
how the separate missions could be trained/evaluated by
trainers from within the battalion. Note that the battalion
executive officer could be used as a T/E/C for the battalion
field training exercise portion. It would enhance the
battalion's training if coordination could be made to pro-
vide for an opposing enemy force made up from another unit
outside of the battalion in order to allow the battalion to
train as a complete unit and still have an opposing force.
The example shown in Figure 2-3, along with its Attach-
ments , is not intended as the exact method to follow but only
as an example of a method that could be used if a complete
internal T/E is deemed necessary. Complete internal T/E's
such as the one depicted can be accomplished only under ideal
conditions; due to resource constraints, not all units can
manage two continual weeks or more of field training per
quarter. The internal program portrayed here can readily be
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partitioned and/or modified to fit any unit's needs and
capabilities. Note that the battalion "pooling" of T/E/C's
shown in Attachment 3, Figure 2-3 is a seeming contradiction
of the decentralized concept. However, this approach may
be desirable in situations where the battalion, because of
the lack of qualified trainers in certain positions, needs
to consolidate, and use qualified T/E/C's for each mission/
task.
• Company Ticu.yu.yiq Viogtiam should be tkz ^ocal po-int
Ojj a.11 ixYi-it a.c.t-iv-itA.2.6 .
The commander's first concern must be to order all the
activities of his unit to meet his primary obligation to the
Army, his unit, and his soldiers: produce a unit ready to
4fight and win now. The activities of the company are put
in order through continual training under a complete train-
ing program. The company commander is primarily a trainer
with most of his resources and training being managed by
battalion. The training manager provides guidance and
establishes goals for trainers and supports them; the trainer
concentrates on making training happen. Training management,
a complex, deliberate, and administratively burdensome func-
tion is difficult at company level and can be accomplished
more effectively at battalion level.




Under the decentralized training system, discussed
earlier in this chapter, the majority of training and
resource management for the company is done at battalion
level. This does not mean that any of the company commander's
authority or leadership and training techniques are being
diminished. It does mean, however, that the company com-
mander can do the job that he was originally intended to
do and that is to train his company.
The effectiveness of company training is greatly increased
by the company commander's presence. The time that the
company commander spends with his units during training is
inversely related to the time required of him to administer
to non-training activities . If a company is training for
six hours during a normal duty day, the company commander
should be free to spend as much as six full hours with his
units while the training is occurring.
To produce a company ready to fight and win, if it were
called into action tomorrow, the company commander must mold
a fighting unit. This can only be accomplished by his con-
stant attention to the training of his individual soldiers
and their collective development as a unit.
•" Tkz Company JAaX.ni.ng PA.ogA.am should pH.ovi.dz ^oa
pA.actlc.al tzckn<Lqu£A ofi SM and ARTE? lnt2.gA.ati.on.
In accomplishing this training objective the company
commander must use a combination of training techniques for
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the practical integration of individual training using the
Soldiers Manuals and collective training using the ARTEP.
To provide an example of how this can be accomplished, it
is first necessary to know when and where to concentrate the
training effort. In using the green-red-yellow scheme in
Chapter 1 for allocating "prime" training time, as much of
the red and yellow training time as possible should be
devoted to the individual training of soldiers and to the
collective training of unit missions where training weak-
nesses have been identified. As much of the green training
time as possible should be devoted to integrated individual
and collective training.
The training of individual soldiers for their jobs and
MOS can best be accomplished by decentralizing individual
training to NCO's. The Soldier's Manual tells NCO's where
to find material to support training for each individual
task expected at each skill level within each MOS. Individual
training in the units has the following characteristics which
are taken from TC 21-5-7:
A. It is decentralized to the first line supervisor.
B. It is individualized and tailored for each soldier.
C. It is self-paced, requiring the commitment of each
soldier, and full use of Training Extension Courses (TEC)
,
correspondence courses , and General Educational Development
(GED)
.
D. It need not depend on scheduled classes only, but
takes place continuously, whenever and wherever a leader




A well-trained soldier is the basis for all combat
ready, well-trained units. The soldiers' abilities, which
result from an individual training program, are demonstrated
in several ways. SQT performance is one; another is the
individuals performance of an individual training task,
which is included within a mission, in the ARTEP.
It is this approach that ties individual and collective
training together. The SM skills obtained by the individual
soldier are demonstrated in any T/E using the ARTEP. Collec-
tive training should be conducted at company level, using
the ARTEP, with a development from crew missions up through
platoon and possibly even company missions to assist the
soldier in the realization of his skills and to emphasize
the fact that they have practical and even critical value to
the success of his unit.
As the company's individual training progresses a transi-
tion can be made into collective training. This is accom-
plished through relating individual skills to time and space
within the context of a squad or higher mission. Although
an earlier example shows much of the battalions green time
occupied with battalion and below T/E's, it does not intend
to present the picture that only collective T/E is accomplished
during a training quarter. At company level, as the unit
training is progressing to the collective development stage,
the company commander should concentrate his training empha-
sis at crew and squad level. As this is developed there is
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a natural flow to platoon and company level. The collective
training at squad level is where the integration of individual
and collective skills is most evident to the individual
soldier. It is here where the purpose of the SQT and the
ARTEP are displayed to the soldier and it is here where the
integration of the two must be accomplished.
• The. pfiopzn. u^se o & ARTE? £/ia.A.n<Lng / zvatuat-ion A.z-i>utt6
ihouZd pfiovLdz the. unit bzZng tKa-iyizd I e.v ataatzd u)<L£k
Immzd'ia.tz ^zzdback.
As indicated by the feedback loop models in ARTEP 71-2,
the information obtained in the evaluation process is used
as input into the decision-making process for the design
and conduct of future unit training efforts.
There are two features of closed- loop training programs
that determine how effective they will be. The first is
the structure for obtaining feedback and the second is the
willingness of unit leaders to accept and use the feedback.
Feedback may take a variety of forms . It may be delivered
orally or in writing, either by persons within or outside the
unit being trained/evaluated. It may contain evaluative
judgments and/or hard, objective facts.
It is recommended that, whenever practicable, the unit
(crew, squad, platoon) being trained/evaluated be given
gDepartment of the Army, ARTEP 71-2




immediate oral feedback following each mission/task. These
critiques can either be scheduled as an integral part of
training, or can take place during lulls in training. Also,
in some missions/tasks additional written feedback can be
provided. An example of a one page consolidation of the
accurate, detailed result data of the mechanized infantry-
squad forced march/live fire mission is shown on the following
page (Figure 2-4) . A normal field T/E packet used by the
trainer/evaluator would include the Training and Evaluation
Outline (T&EO) , a map of the terrain or range used, a scen-
ario and possibly mission support information. The normal
practice, upon completion of a mission, is for the trainer/
evaluator to give the results orally and/or provide the unit
leader with a completed T&EO from the packet. The results
shown on the T&EO allow for either satisfactory or unsatis-
factory ratings and do not allow for specifics such as num-
ber of target hits, preparation and execution times, and
other exact data that could be important to the unit leader.
Because of this, it is recommended that a one page consoli-
dated mission data result sheet be used with a copy being
provided to the unit leader. This can greatly aid the unit
leader in providing him with exact information on his units'
strengths and weaknesses. Note that in the example shown of
the squad forced march/live fire result sheet, general infor-
mation such as weather conditions, weapons and equipment
status, and number of unit members present are also indicated.
This information may be valuable to the unit leader in the
60





Sqd/Plt/Co Full Name Total # Date
All Weapons and Equipment Present (If No , explain on reverse side)
Yes/No
Gas Masks Worn During Firing Weather
Yes/No Wind Cond. (rain, clear, etc) Temp
Tasks and Task Evaluations .
Conduct Forced March: Time




Start Finish Total SAT/NAT
Selection of Positions
SAT/NAT




# of targets 10 SAT/NAT
7nne 2 = t
of targets hit
= = %
# of targets 10 J ^/m
Zone 3 =
# of targets hit
= =
# of targets 10 SAT/NAT
Engagement of Armor Targets
Near Taraet = # of target hitsg
# of ^ rds f^ 5 __,_
Near Target Distance
(75-175 meters)
# of target hits
_Far Target -
# Qf 90nin rds fired 3 SAT/NM,
Far Target Distance
(At least 300 meters)




Full Name (Print) Rank Branch Unit Signature




preparation for future missions and possibly in mission
result comparisons.
• Tkz pnopzn. tue o^ ARTE? tn.a,A.ning / zv aluatlo n iztultA
should pn.ovi.dz ^on. tkz mcu.nta.Zn.ing o& ac.cun.CLtz,
dztaiJJLzd information on tztzztzd miA&ion* that ujzn.z
conductzd.
There is little information available on the significance
of keeping historical mission result data, mainly because
there are so many variables involved such as time, weather
conditions, and personnel transfers. However, the availa-
bility of accurate and detailed mission result data is bene-
ficial for observing overall trends in training strengths
and weaknesses. Certain missions, such as the squad forced
march/live fire, can provide results that are of extreme
importance to battalion unit leaders as they provide nearly
complete T/E analysis of the battalion fighting units. If
»the consolidated mission data result sheets are prepared
properly they can also be used as historical information.
The battalion training managers cannot manage effectively
without a training information system that includes T/E results
obtained during a well-managed training program. The training
information system concept will be discussed in Chapter 3.
If the results are not there, training resources could be
wasted by not following a well-managed plan of concentrating
on training weaknesses while maintaining training strengths.
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In addition, the trend in the future for Army training
is the development of ARTEP T/E models which will allow a
commander to select priority missions with his given resource
constraints and be provided a realistic estimate of what
training he can conduct. These models will be based on a
mission priority selection by the commander. The primary
source of information for prioritizing missions can only
come from accurate, detailed mission result data.
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VI. CHAPTER 3: GUIDANCE FOR THE TRAINING/EVALUATION/CONTROL
OF THE EXTERNAL TRAINING/EVALUATION EXERCISE
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VI. CHAPTER 3; GUIDANCE FOR THE TRAINING/EVALUATION/CONTROL
OF THE EXTERNAL TRAINING/EVALUATION EXERCISE
A. INTRODUCTION
Guidelines for the performing unit's conduct of the
external T/E are generally well defined and specified.
However, the guidance and instruction for the evaluation
and control is generalized and often vague. In this chap-
ter, an improved T/E/C system, with specific recommendations,
will be presented with the purpose of providing a systematic
structure for the preparation and conduct of evaluation
and control.
The objectives of conducting a battalion external T/E
are to provide training for the battalion and to assist in
diagnosing performance deficiencies in order to shape future
training efforts to correct these deficiencies. With respect
to both of these objectives, no element of the over-all
evaluation effort is more critical than the T/E/C group and
the way it does its job. Logically, in a performance-oriented
atmosphere, it is absolutely essential that performance be
evaluated properly and accurately. In this context, evalua-
tion is highly dependent upon control and therefore both
elements assume crucial importance.
The rationale for devising the external T/E plan and
the evolution of the scenario with missions and supplemental
missions have been included in previous chapters. Given that
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these planning steps have been accomplished, the T/E/C
group is expected to perform the following tasks: act as
higher headquarters and conduct the performing unit through
the offline and online segments; evaluate the unit's perfor-
mance; assess casualties and battle results; control OPFOR;
provide battlefield realism; give immediate and summary feed-
back to the unit; make on-the-spot corrections whenever
possible; and settle disputes.
The economic facts of life dictate that because of train-
ing costs, battalion-size units will undergo an external T/E
only infrequently based on unit needs and higher headquarters
'
guidance. The expenditure of manpower and resources will be
considerable; it is reasonable to expect in return a valuable
training benefit from this experience. The T/E/C group is
the key to realizing this benefit. An efficient, well-
trained, well-organized system of evaluation and control is
needed. This translates into resource commitments of time,
personnel, and equipment, all of which are precious to com-
manders at all levels. However, the simple fact remains
that to reap the full dividends of the ARTEP philosophy,
the needs of the T/E/C group must be satisfied. Feedback
from the field supports this declaration; the single most
often repeated criticism of external T/E's using ARTEP (Tank/
Mechanized Infantry Task Force) is the lack of quality and
consistency in the evaluation and control.
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B. SUMMARY OF GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Improved Trainer/Evaluator/Controller system should
provide
:
• HZghzn. quaZZty tA.aA.ni.ng/ zva.Zuat4.on {oa. thz pzfihoim4.no.
unZt and moA.z u4z{uZ zva.tuat4.vz Zn{onmatZon {oa. tkz
AponAOA.4.ng hzadquaA.tzA.4 .
• A {undamzntaZ 6tn.uc.tunz o{ an ZnfaonmatZon AyAtzm that
u)ZZZ AuppZy uaz{uZ Zn{onmatZon {on tn.a4.n4.ng managzte,
and {on. tn.a4.n4.ng anaZyt>Zi> .
The Senior Evaluator should:




• InAunz that zv aZuato n. / co ntn.o ZZzn tn.a4.n4.ng Za accom-
pZZthzd pnJ.on. to thz zxtzAnaZ J IE.
• Pn.0v4.dz &pzcZ{Zc Zn& tn.uctZo ni> to T/E/C'a n.zgan.dZng
{zzdback pn.oczdun.zA, ZntzgnatZon o{ KatZngh , and
thzZn. Zntzn.actZon uiZth OPPOP..
An External Training/Evaluation Exercise should:






• 8e AchzduZzd Zn a May that wZZZ aZZow {on. a natun.aZ
mZAAZon {Zow and zoaz o{ zvaZuatton and contn.oZ.
C. DISCUSSION OF GUIDANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• Thz Zmpn.ovzd T/E/C 4y6tzm AhouZd pnovZdz hZghzn. quaZZty
tn.a4.nZng/zvaZuatZ0n {on thz pzn.{onmZng unZt and monz




ARTEP 71-2 gives specific recommendations as to the
size and organization of the T/E/C group for the battalion
external T/E. The current T/E/C system has not performed
adequately in most cases, usually due to a lack of resource
commitment and/or poor training. An improved prototype
organizational chart for the T/E/C group is shown in Figures
3-2 and 3-3. The improved T/E/C system is no remedy
for inadequate resource commitment. Division and Brigade
Commanders will have to make the proper resource allocation
decisions
.
The improved T/E/C organizational scheme has three
important features: the formalization of T/E/C subgroups
at Company/Team and Battalion/Task Force echelons; the crea-
tion of a separate Control/Simulation (C/S) specialist posi-
tion; and the sponsoring headquarters plays the dominant role
in the T/E/C system. The improved T/E/C group structure has
several advantages. First, formalizations of T/E/C sub-
groups provide the basis for structured observation and con-
trol at lower echelons. Prior planning of observational
strategies and of cueing requirements is facilitated. For
example, in a Company/Team mission, the Company/Team T/E/C
could plan well in advance where he wanted each Platoon T/E/C
to be, and what specifically to be observed. The Company/
Team T/E/C also has decided in advance how he plans to inte-
grate the evaluations and observations from the Platoon
T/E/C 's to formulate an over-all Company/Team evaluation.
68

This feature has been incorporated into most T/E/C group
structures since ARTEP was introduced.
Second, the creation of a separate (C/S) specialist
position devotes resources solely to increase the combat
realism of the T/E. The C/S specialist will devote full
time to the scenario and the simulation of the technical
aspects of combat, such as weapons signatures and weapons
effects on personnel and equipment. At the same time, sub-
unit T/E/C 's are relieved of some of the burden of C/S
duties and can concentrate on observation/evaluation. With
the infrequency of the external T/E, there is no anticipated
problem in providing incentives for the performing unit's
members. However, the perception by these members that
considerable effort is being made to portray combat realis-
tically should have a favorably reinforcing effect on their
attitude toward the exercise and their subsequent participa-
tion in it.
Third, the sponsoring headquarters plays a dominant role
in the training/evaluation/control of the performing unit.
Brigade sponsorship is specifically recommended; the explana-
tion and examples that follow assume that brigade sponsor-
ship is the approach used. Figure 3-2 shows that the bulk
of T/E/C personnel at Battalion/Task Force Headquarters comes
from Brigade Headquarters. The Senior T/E/C is the Brigade
Commander, the person most closely in touch with the needs
and capabilities of the battalion, and excepting the performing
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unit's members, the person most intensely concerned with the
training/evaluation of the unit. As both Senior E/C and
Brigade Commander, he can tailor the external T/E to fit
whatever schemes of offline-online, primary-supplemental mis-
sion combinations that he chooses, taking into consideration
the ARTEP requirements, the Battalion Commander's training
assessment, and any instructions received from higher head-
quarters. Also, as Senior T/E/C, the Brigade Commander will
be expected to utilize brigade assets as much as possible,
and to fully justify any requests for outside assets. This
is not to imply complete exhaustion of brigade assets; out-
side assets are often preferable and in some cases manda-
tory. Detailed examples at the end of this chapter illus-
trate this point. However, in the case of the Battalion/
Task Force Headquarters, the choice of respective Brigade
Headquarters personnel as T/E/C 's offers not only the opti-
mal opportunity of first-hand T/E of the performing unit,
but also the opportunity to identify and eliminate any
operational difficulties between the two headquarters.
• Tke. ZmpA.0v2.cL T/E/C &yi>£zm bkomtd px.ovi.de. a ^andamantat
AtA.uc£uA.z ofi an i.nfioAma£ion bqbtzm that wi.lt Supply
uAzfiuZ. -LnfioA.maX4.oyi fioA. tA.aX.ni.ng managzAS and fioA.
tA.OA.nX.ng anaZy6X.A
.
Currently, much of the valuable data from a unit's T/E
is essentially wasted. Information that is needed for train-
ing analysis is either unavailable or available only in
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grossly aggregated form, e.g., the listing of Satisfactory/
Unsatisfactory mission results required by ARTEP 71-2 to
be sent to Fort Benning. The improved T/E/C system is
first and foremost intended to improve the effectiveness
of ARTEP. However, a coincidental opportunity is available
to gather data at little or no marginal increase of resource
use. A singular example is the evaluation sheet recommended
for use in the Squad Forced March/Live Fire, Figure 2-4.
Besides being a valuable T/E tool, these sheets can be
stored as historical information available for future trainers
and training analysts. Although the Forced March/Live Fire
is a mission exceptionally conducive to quantification, it
is expected that more subjective type missions will yield
results, once their quantifiable aspects have been identified
and analyzed. Initially, at least, this type of information
system will be restricted to missions performed in the off-
line segment of the external T/E, where situationally struc-
tured events are expected and where T/E/C density will be
high anyway, in order to support ranges, REALTRAIN, etc.
The feedback loops in the ARTEP (both internal and
external) can conceptually form the structure of an informa-
tion system. See Figure 3-1. During the internal phase
of T/E, the information flow is characterized by informal
communication between the training managers at battalion
level and the trainers at company level. Quantified results
are stored at battalion level and available in formulating
































battalion and brigade and between brigade and division are
one-way, from lower to higher. This information consists of
summarized internal T/E results, in the case of information
sent to brigade, and unit T/E status in the case of informa-
tion sent to division.
In the external T/E exercise, the information flow is
somewhat different. The T/E/C elements at each level receive
information from the performing unit in the form of opera-
tional results; feedback from T/E/C to the unit is provided
in two ways, immediate online critiques and end-of-exercise
written evaluations. The end-of-exercise evaluations are
passed up the T/E/C chain of command and aggregated at
T/E/C headquarters (brigade headquarters) . Brigade head-
quarters passes the final detailed end-of-exercise evaluation
to battalion, who in turn passes the appropriate portion to
each company. The companies digest this information, formu-
late a plan to correct deficiencies, and send it back to
battalion, who in turn passes a plan of anticipated measures
to correct identified weaknesses to brigade. The information
that brigade passes to division, concerning the external
T/E exercise, is a summarized evaluation which should be a
confirmation of unit T/E status.
The residual, quantified information from both internal
and external T/E phases is maintained at battalion level.
The format and detail in which it should be stored, so as




• Ike. i>zn-ioA zvaZaatoA. 6kouZd pA.0v4.de. and be. pAov-idzd
ujyitk qua.Z<L£y p e.A.6 o nnzZ cu> tA.cuLne.A.4 / evaZuatoAA/ con£A.oZZzA.A
The role of the T/E/C has already been discussed in
some depth and is also defined in ARTEP 71-2. A major prob-
lem is that personnel assigned as T/E/C s perform these duties
as additional temporary duties. Units that are tasked to
provide T/E/C 's tend to fill these positions not on a
"most qualified" or "best qualified" basis, but rather on
a "qualified and can be spared" basis. The scheme of tasking
by Division/Brigade Headquarters is a key to the quality of
T/E/C s. The most often used and probably least optimal is
the simple tasking of one battalion to provide the entire
T/E/C structure for a like battalion, i.e., the Commander
of Battalion 1 is the Senior Evaluator, the S-3 of Battalion
1 is the S-3 T/E/C, the Commander of Company A, Battalion 1
is the T/E/C for Team A, etc. Profoundly simple in organi-
zation, adaptability, and ease of operation, this scheme
is seriously flawed. It is unreasonable and unrealistic to
expect any battalion at any given time to have experienced
personnel in every position; and this is precisely what is
needed to fill the T/E/C function of the external T/E. There
are organizational structuring techniques that can be used
to improve the probability of getting quality personnel as
T/E/C s. First, the Brigade Commander as the Senior Evalua-
tor immediately attracts the attention of potential T/E/C
suppliers within the brigade. Second, the requirements are
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spread among a number of units. This technique seemingly
violates a previous recommendation for the brigade to do
as much as possible with its own resources. However,
requiring some assets from a number of units exploits the
natural tendency to put one's best foot foward in high
visibility activities such as an external T/E. A detailed
example of such a scheme is presented at the end of this
chapter.
• The. S2.ni.0n. Eva.Zua.to K thouZd inbixfie. that txatnzn./
evaZuatoi/ co ntn.o ZZen. tn.OA.ni.ng Za accompZZAhe,d pn.Zon.
to the ex.ten.naZ T/E.
The inadequacies that are apparent in the training of
most T/E/C's prior to external T/E's are usually the result
of not enough time, effort, and command emphasis being placed
on the development of the T/E/C's. This development should
normally be accomplished during a two day T/E/C school.
However, even this program takes precious resources; two
more full days are required for T/E/C's already facing a
3-4 day separation from their primary duties , not including
the preparation required for the school itself. There are
no easy ways to alleviate this requirement; it is essential
that each T/E/C attend all sessions of the school, make the
proper coordination, wargame the events, and walk the ter-
rain. Command attention is the only solution, and again with
the Brigade Commander as the Senior Evaluator, proper emphasis
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is already implied. The Brigade Staff is also the logical
organization to plan and implement the school, with advice
and assitance from G-3. In initially prescribing the require-
ments for T/E/C personnel, and in the subsequent taskings,
the duration of duty should be explicitly stated; attendance
at the school should be a matter of command interest, with
the Brigade Commander setting the example as Senior Evaluator.
• Tkz S2.nA.of1 Eva.lua.toi should piovA.de. bpzci^tc
lnbtn.1xc.tA.0nA> to the, T/E/C* n.zgaA.dA.ng fazzdback pn.oc.z-
duizA , tntzgn.ati.on
fa
nattng* , and tkzin intznactton
with OPFOR.
The sample program of instruction described in TC 21-5-7
is an outline, and as such deals with topics and not detailed
specifics. At least three areas require the special effort
of the Senior Evaluator to give specific instructions to
individual T/E/C s in order to standardize what are often
general guidelines
.
The first of these areas involves feedback procedures.
ARTEP 71-2 gives general information on how and when to con-
duct feedback sessions during the external T/E exercise.
However, the T/E/C school should refine these generalities,
so that each T/E/C knows when to conduct a session, who
should attend it, and what key points should be covered.
Care must be taken not to damage the effectiveness of the
chain of command by presenting critical comments to too
general an audience. For example, there is little to gain
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and much to lose by critiquing a leader who has performed
poorly or made a wrong decision, by airing his deficiencies
in the presence of his followers. Normally, in such a situa-
tion, the members realize that mistakes have been made and
the public dissection of an already humbled leader can cause
irreparable damage to his position as a leader. A better
approach might be to give the group evaluative comments on
its performance as a group, then take the leader aside and
give him personal constructive comments on his performance.
If the leader's mistakes were serious enough to cause his
unit to not meet the standards of the mission or task, it
is up to the leader himself to pass that information to the
unit. In the case of a company/team or higher level mission,
a procedure must be agreed upon in advance that includes
some feedback in some form for all elements of the unit.
The training responsibility of the T/E/C also mandates that
the T/E/C explicitly understands the standards and the condi-
tions; any guidelines on interpretation of subjective events
should be standardized by the Senior Evaluator.
The second area that requires specific instructions is
the method to be used for integrating ratings. It is intuitive
that the performance of a company/team is directly related
to the performance of its platoons and ultimately related to
the performance of its individual soldiers. The standards
and conditions of many of the company level and higher missions
significantly rely on the T/E/C 's subjective judgment, e.g.,
77

"did the unit secure the objective without sustaining
excessive casualites?" It is difficult for a single T/E/C
to observe enough events simultaneously to make that judgment;
for each mission, it should be agreed upon in advance what
key areas should be observed and how the T/E/C s should be
disposed to fill that need. Incidental information should
be planned for, such as checking with higher headquarters
on the accuracy and timeliness of reporting and indirect
fire procedures. The T/E/C school is the proper format in
which T/E/C 's should coordinate and arrange for such plans.
Concurrent improvisation during the external T/E exercise
is difficult, if not impossible.
An important aid to T/E/C s in fulfilling their respon-
sibilities is the proper use of a well-motivated OPFOR.
After-action consultation with the leader of the OPFOR by
an T/E/C on a particular mission is a vital link in making
an accurate evaluation and in revealing training deficien-
cies of the unit, such as early detection, improper camou-
flage, skylining of vehicles, etc. Without prior coordina-
tion between the T/E/C s and OPFOR, this link becomes ill-
defined, or hastily improvised with significant loss of
information. Also, it becomes increasingly obvious that the
OPFOR must be well trained and imbued with the proper spirit,
i.e., that the exercise is primarily intended to benefit the
training status of the performing unit and is not perceived
as an opportunity for the OPFOR to exhibit its superiority
over a sister unit.
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• An zx.tzn.na.1 tn.a.A.ni.viQ / zv aluati.0 n zxzic<Laz should
lnc.lu.dz tkz uaz o& a complztz and do.ta.llzd T/E/C
4>tA.uztuA.z.
Many of the T/E/C structures used for external training/
evaluations do not provide for the efficient use of all
T/E/C 's available. For example, when an external T/E is
conducted under brigade control, the brigade has numerous
officers and NCO's who are highly qualified who are not
normally used as T/E/C s. The practice has often been to
use a battalion staff from another battalion to evaluate the
staff of the exercised battalion when in fact the brigade
staff would be much more appropriate. The same is true for
the chief T/E/C. Normally a fellow battalion commander is
used as the primary evaluator of the exercised battalion
commander. The Brigade Commander of the battalion being
evaluated should be the senior T/E/C as well as the primary
evaluator of his battalion commander. It is common in the
majority of battalion external T/E exercises that the respec-
tive brigade staff is required to participate in the exer-
cise as the controlling headquarters anyway. Not using
them as key members of the T/E/C structure can only lead to
resource waste and inefficiency through mismanagement.
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 on the two following pages present examples
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portions. The duties corresponding to each of the assignments
are outlined below.
A. Battalion Task Force Senior T/E/C . The Task Force
senior T/E/C is the O-I-C of the evaluation exercise and
the T/E/C group. He should normally be the Brigade Commander
of the battalion being evaluated. His primary duties include:
1. Overall supervision, direction and coordination
of T/E/C group preparation and performance.
2. Evaluation of Task Force Commander performance,
and performance of Task Force as an integral unit.
3. Provides Brigade Command/Staff simulation for the
evaluated unit by issuance of orders, intelligence, etc.
4. Assisted by Deputy, monitors and resolves
exercise control, arbitration and simulation which impact
on the overall evaluation effort.
B. Deputy Senior T/E/C . The deputy senior T/E/C is the
officer charged with direct responsibility for field control
of the on-line portion and the running of the off-line por-
tion under the general supervision of the senior T/E/C. He
should be an 0-4 and would typically be the brigade S-3 or
one of the brigade non-evaluated battalion XO's. His primary
duties include:
-I. Maintains field control through coordination with
OPFOR during on-line portion of exercise.
2. Maintains current situation/location display
for all Task Force and OPFOR elements.
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3. Directs tactical operations of OPFOR according
to scenario schedule of events and senior T/E/C guidance.
4. Responsibility for the control and execution of
the off-line portion of the exercise.
C. T/E/C Subgroup Personnel . T/E/C personnel assigned
to Task Force elements are allocated as efficiently as
possible while maintaining their capability to train/
evaluate/control. Their primary duties include:
1. Conduct of evaluations of performance of Task
Force elements as assigned.
2. Provide feedback as directed by senior T/E/C.
3. Assist Battle Simulation officer with implemen-
tation of simulation at appropriate Task Force level.
D. Battle Simulation Officer . The battle simulation
officer is charged with the control of tactical simulation
functions under the general supervision of the senior T/E/C.
His primary duties include:
1. Coordination of simulation activities by OPFOR
and Task Force level T/E/C s.
2. Responsibility of major simulation activities
such as bomb simulation, major NBC attacks, major artillery
concentrations, etc.
3. Accountability of simulation materials.
E
.
Opposing Force Commander . The OPFOR Commander '
s
duties include:
1. Tactical command of the OPFOR in accordance
with the scenario schedule of events and guidance from the
senior T/E/C and/or coordination with the deputy T/E/C.
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2. Responsibility for preparation of OPFOR to
conduct operations as defined in the evaluation plan,
including appropriate threat doctrine.
F. Off-Line subgroup T/E/C . The senior T/E/C's of
all of the missions exercised during the off-line portion
can be the same officers used for T/E/C's during the on-
line portion. Care must be taken to insure that the offi-
cers are experts on the particular mission that they are
responsible for. Their responsibilities include:
1. The evaluation and control of the particular
mission or missions which they have been assigned under
the guidance of the deputy senior T/E/C.
2. Setting up of the exercise to include range
preparation training and procurement, ammunition requests,
etc.
G. Ammo-Support Center Officer . This officer would
normally be a support platoon leader from one of the non-
evaluated battalions of the brigade. He must be familiar
with all of the ammunition requirements , both live and
blank, of all the off-line missions. He is responsible,
directly to the deputy senior T/E/C, for all control,
delivery and pick-up of ammunition. He is further responsi-
ble for the secure and safe maintaining of the ammunition
throughout the exercise.
• An <Lxto,n.nal training / evaluation zxtficlA e iih.ou.Ld. be.
ickzdulzd In a way that Mill allow fa a a. a natural mic-
tion ^low and e.a-6 e o{ evaluation and control.
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Many of the officers and NCO's who were used as T/E/C's
during the off-line portion can also be used as T/E/C's
during the on-line portion of the exercise. Although in
the examples in Figures 3-2 and 3-3 the total number of
T/E/C personnel is not significantly smaller than is normally
used, the overall exercise requires less personnel support.
This is accomplished primarily through the use of the bri-
gade staff as T/E/C's as well as higher headquarters. This
efficiency improvement will also aid in the ease of evalua-
tion and control in general since the brigade would normally
be more familiar with its battalions' operations than would
a T/E/C source from outside of the brigade.
/ The external training/evaluation exercise should be
scheduled so that only key missions, and/or missions that
would be difficult to evaluate otherwise, are evaluated
during the off-line portion. The more subunit evaluations
that are conducted during the on-line portion as part of
the tactical exercise the more the soldier will see his
responsibilities to his unit's overall efforts. However,
the more subunit evaluations that are conducted during the
on-line portion, the more difficult it becomes to structure
an exercise that has a natural mission flow that maintains
a realistic tactical scenario. An example of how this could
be accomplished on a particular subunit mission would be
the evaluation of the squad night reconnaissance patrol as
part of an overall night attack mission during the on-line
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portion of an external T/E exercise is shown in Figures 3-4
and 3-5. Note that they correspond to the earlier Figures
on the T/E/C structure.
Figures 3-4 and 3-5 include all of the minimum required
mission evaluations from ARTEP 71-2 as well as a few addi-
tional ones. Evaluating all of the squads on the squad
FM/LF mission follows an earlier recommendation, although
if only 1/3 of the squads were evaluated (the minimum require-
ment) , the off-line portion of the exercise depicted in the
example would only last 2 days. The on-line portion can be
accomplished in 2 days and 2 nights of continuous exercise
and evaluation as shown in Figure 3-5.
The off-line and on-line portion of the exercise should
be separated by several days to assist in the ease of evalu-
ation and control. The advantages of conducting an external
T/E exercise similar to the one portrayed in the examples
are significant. There are fewer personnel required to
support the exercise; there is a natural tactical flow to
the on-line portion which is not broken by individual sub-
unit T/E's; the structure of the exercise is simple and
manageable; the soldier is included as an integral part of
the T/E; and the exercise provides for the obtaining of
detailed and accurate result data on key missions, which
is the only realistic way to provide the evaluated battalion
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* If Tank Pits are eval. 1/3 of unit must be eval. on Ch. 8, App. 29
(Battle Run)
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